ART - (JOPP) Public Procurement Auctions in Sweden 2012

The document discusses a study on combinatorial auctions, specifically focusing on sealed-bid auctions of multiple units. The study compares the distribution of bids across different bidding formats and also examines the distribution of bids within the combinatorial format under different constraints. The literature review highlights the interdisciplinary nature of combinatorial auctions and the various aspects that have been studied by computer scientists, mathematicians, and economists. The study also references a related work that analyzed bidding strategies in a first-price sealed-bid auction with two local bidders and one global bidder. The experimental results showed that the package rule in combinatorial bidding generated lower expected revenues to the seller compared to the separate rule. However, when the constraint of not allowing standalone bids on individual items was relaxed, package bidding generated higher revenues. The document also mentions empirical studies on the use of combinatorial procurement auctions, particularly in the procurement of transportation services, and how the adoption of combinatorial bidding has been beneficial in lowering procurement costs. The data for the study is collected from asphalt resurfacing contracts in two regions in Sweden, with combinatorial bidding allowed in one region and not in the other. The bidding process and the data collection methodology are described, and the summary statistics of the data are provided, including the average bid per ton for different regions (€67.04, €98.47, €96.92, €81.45).